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THE MANAGERIAL TURN IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
CARY COGLIANESE*
Over the last four decades, many aspects of environmental
quality have improved in the United States. Nevertheless, existing
environmental laws and regulations have often proven exceedingly
costly, and some of the most vexing and significant environmental
problems, such as climate change and nonpoint water pollution,
still remain largely unaddressed.
These twin challenges—
excessive costs and untapped benefits—have prompted rightful
and repeated calls for new approaches to environmental protection.
One new approach self-consciously seeks to affect the way that
businesses manage their environmental affairs. In the past,
environmental law effectively treated firms themselves as “black
boxes,” imposing risk-based or technology-based emissions limits
that simply directed regulated firms to control the pollution they
emit. The ways firms managed their operations largely remained
irrelevant to regulators as long as firms met their legal obligations.
That old view is changing and the black box is beginning to open.
Regulators and policy analysts increasingly recognize that firms’
internal management is an important ingredient in combating the
nation’s environmental problems.1
*

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and the Edward B. Shils Professor of
Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The author thanks Susan Rose Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 151 (2001) (noting how the importance of
environmental management systems and other “reflexive” strategies is likely to
grow “[a]s the pressure of heightening environmental standards and complexities
increases and the limitations of command regulation [becomes] more apparent”);
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR
IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 6 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer
Nash eds., 2006) (“Policymakers and business leaders increasingly recognize that
what goes on inside the black box of the organization is of critical importance for
overall environmental quality.”); KENNETH GEISER, MATERIALS MATTER:
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE MATERIALS POLICY 381–82 (2001) (arguing for “new
management approaches that encourage and rely on continuous learning and
organizational change” because attaining a “sustainable economy [requires that]
54
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This “managerial turn” represents a notable, and potentially
laudable, shift in regulatory focus relevant to future environmental
policy reform. Governmental strategies to shape firms’ internal
management may well achieve environmental goals at lower costs.
Such management-based strategies tend not to impose one-sizefits-all standards, but instead give firms responsibility for
developing their own responses to environmental problems,
thereby leveraging firms’ superior knowledge about the risks they
generate and the potential methods of reducing those risks. Given
their promise, management-based environmental policies deserve
greater attention. In this article, I examine several recent
management-based strategies, consider the empirical evidence on
their effectiveness in improving environmental performance, and
assess their overall advantages and disadvantages. The evidence
shows that, at least in some cases, management-based policy
strategies can lead to improvements in industry’s environmental
performance by getting firms to sink additional costs into assessing
and better managing their environmental aspects. As such,
Congress and regulatory agencies should consider the role of
management-based strategies in environmental policy’s future.
I. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES
The managerial turn is reflected in the actions of both
governmental officials and business leaders who focus on directly
shaping private sector environmental management. Their interest
in management-based strategies grows generally from a trend
toward environmental management systems (EMSs) that started in
the 1990s.2 An EMS consists of a series of internal planning
processes and operational procedures implemented by a firm both
to ensure compliance with regulatory standards as well as to try to
improve the firm’s environmental performance.3 Although the
specific shape and structure of an EMS can vary across different
firms, all management systems involve some kind of
corporations and other institutions will need to redesign their culture and
reorganize their structures”).
2
See E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: A Pollution Control Program
That Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840, 1841 (1994).
3
See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management
Systems and the New Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1 (Cary
Cognlianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).
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environmental planning and internal policymaking. To create an
EMS, managers begin by establishing environmental goals and
creating a specific plan to achieve those goals. Managers and
workers are assigned responsibilities for implementing parts of the
plan, and they are trained in what they need to carry out these
responsibilities.
They keep records that document their
compliance with the plan and periodically the firm (or an outside
auditor) reviews these records and assesses the firm’s performance
in meeting its goals and following its internal procedures. These
periodic reviews are supposed to feed into revisions and
continuous improvements in the firm’s overall system. When
auditing turns up deficiencies or problems, managers take remedial
action and, as needed, amend their plan, returning to the start of
what is commonly referred to as the “plan-do-check-act” cycle.4
Trade associations and other non-governmental organizations
have developed various standards or guidelines for EMSs. The
American Chemistry Council (ACC), the chemical industry’s most
prominent trade association, requires its members to implement
internal systems that accord with specific ACC environmental
management principles.5 The most widely recognized EMS
standards are found in “ISO 14001,” a series of certifiable
principles established by the non-governmental International
Organization for Standardization (ISO).6 ISO 14001 does not
require firms to achieve any specific level of environmental
performance, but rather calls on them to engage in “a holistic,
strategic approach to the organization’s environmental policy,
plans and actions.”7 Hundreds of thousands of companies around
the world—and tens of thousands of firms in the U.S.—have
voluntarily certified that their EMSs meet the ISO standards.
Government officials share the business community’s interest
in EMSs. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
concluded that “EMSs can help facilities achieve significantly

4

See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Policy Options for Improving
Environmental Management in the Private Sector, ENV’T, Nov. 2002, at 11.
5
Joseph Rees, Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical
Industry, 19 LAW & POL’Y 477, 479–80 (1997).
6
See ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 25 (2006).
7
INT’L ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 14000 ESSENTIALS,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials (last visited July 18, 2008).
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improved environmental results” and the agency has decided to
promote their “widespread use . . . to achieve improved
environmental performance and compliance, pollution prevention
through source reduction, and continual improvement.”8 For
years, government prosecutors have included EMS requirements in
consent decrees or given leniency to firms that have in place
compliance-oriented EMSs.9 EPA and its counterparts in the states
have established still more formal programs to encourage firms to
develop EMSs, and in some cases government has even required
outright that firms engage in specified management actions.
The most prominent example of a program that encourages
firms to adopt EMSs is the EPA’s National Environmental
Performance Track.10 Established in 2000, Performance Track is a
voluntary, facility level program designed to recognize and reward
environmental facilities that the EPA considers to be
environmental leaders. According to Carol Browner, the EPA
Administrator at the time of Performance Track’s creation, this
program signaled “a new kind of environmental leadership that
will make the 21st century an age of both continued environmental
prosperity and environmental health.”11 The program works by
having private sector facilities apply to become “members” of
Performance Track. As members, facilities receive special
recognition from EPA as well as more tangible forms of benefits,
such as a reduced inspection frequency and additional flexibility in
meeting certain regulatory requirements.
To qualify for membership in Performance Track, a facility
8

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POSITION STATEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (EMS) (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/
ems/docs/positionstatement-20051215.pdf.
9
See, e.g., Memoranda, John Peter Suarez, Assistant Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance on the Use of Environmental
Management Systems in Enforcement Settlements as Injunctive Relief
and Supplemental Environmental Projects (June 12, 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/incentives/ems/emssettlemen
tguidance.pdf (describing EMSs as a potentially valuable tool for promoting
compliance with environmental standards).
10
See generally Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, EPA’s National
Environmental Performance Track: What Is It Tracking? What Role Is It
Performing? (unpublished manuscript, on file with journal) (describing the
Performance Track program and assessing how it attracts members).
11
Daniel Fiorino, Performance Track Places Trust in the Carrot over the
Stick, ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., Spring 2001, at 9, 22 (quoting Administrator
Browner).
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must show EPA that it meets the following four criteria: (1)
implement an independently audited EMS; (2) sustain a track
record of compliance with environmental regulations; (3) make a
commitment to achieve self-declared environmental goals that
exceed what is currently required by existing regulations; and (4)
demonstrate some engagement in community outreach concerning
the environment.12
Prospective members can apply for
membership during application periods held twice each year.
Those facilities that are admitted must file annual reports, and
every three years members must re-apply for membership. Now in
its eighth year of operation, Performance Track boasts over five
hundred facilities as members.13
In addition to EPA’s national Performance Track program,
over the past decade about twenty states have developed similar
programs that offer recognition and regulatory benefits to facilities
that meet stated, management-related entry criteria.14
For
example, the Commonwealth of Virginia has created an
Environmental Excellence program that has three membership
levels: E2, E3, and E4.15 Facilities that join at the E2 need to
express interest in implementing an EMS, while E3 facilities must
have implemented such a system and E4 facilities must have these
systems certified by a third party and commit to meeting
environmental and community outreach goals. Over 250 facilities
have become members at the E2 level, about 135 at the E3 level,
and about a dozen at the E4 level. Virginia has the largest state
incentive program, but programs similar to Virginia’s can be found
across the country, from Georgia to Idaho, Maine to New
Mexico.16
In other contexts, state and federal regulators have gone
further and have actually mandated that companies implement
management practices. In mandating that firms engage in analysis
and management practices, regulators leave it to the firms to select

12

Id. at 13.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
TRACK, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
14
Jonathan Borck, Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental
Leadership Programs: Toward an Empirical Assessment of their Performance,
ECOLOGY L. Q. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5, on file with journal).
15
Id. at 71.
16
Id.
13
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concrete measures to address the risks they create.17 The most
prominent federal example of such a management-based regulation
is the “risk management planning” (RMP) rule under the Clean Air
Act.18 The RMP rule requires firms that use high volumes of
chemicals to implement a multi-step management practice to
assess risks of chemical accidents, develop procedures designed to
reduce those risks, and take actions to ensure that procedures are
carried out in practice. These firms must first conduct a hazard
analysis to identify what could potentially go wrong in their
facilities’ processes and what steps must be in place to prevent
such accidents from occurring. Firms must rank their different
processes according to factors such as how many workers could
potentially be affected or the operating history of the process,
including any previous incidents involving the process. They must
next identify both actual and potential interventions to reduce
hazards associated with each process, including control
technologies, monitoring and early warning systems, training, and
safety equipment. Based on their analyses, firms must then
develop written operating procedures both for normal operating
conditions and emergency situations. In addition, firms must
continuously review these procedures and update them as
necessary to reflect process changes, new technologies, or new
knowledge. By tracking process and incident data in a systematic
way through RMP, firms are continuously supposed to seek ways
to prevent environmental accidents.19
Another prominent example of management-based regulation
can be found in the regulations of over a dozen states that require
high volume users of hazardous chemicals to engage in pollution
prevention planning.20 Rather than mandating pollution control,
state pollution prevention regulations require businesses to engage
in a management process aimed at preventing pollution from
occurring in the first place. The Massachusetts Toxic Use
17
See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management Based Regulation:
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 691, 694 (2003).
18
See Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions, 40 C.F.R. § 68 (2007).
19
For further discussion of the RMP rule, see Paul R. Kleindorfer, The Risk
Management Program Rule and Management-Based Regulation, in LEVERAGING
THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 1, at 87–109.
20
See Lori S. Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: A
Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Toolbox, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
supra note 1, at 51–52.
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Reduction Act (TURA)21 represents one such effort at
management-based regulation designed to promote pollution
prevention rather than just pollution control. Under TURA,
regulated firms must analyze the use and flow of toxic chemicals
throughout their facilities, develop plans to reduce their use and
emissions of toxics, and submit reports of their planning to state
environmental agencies. Massachusetts also requires that a stateauthorized “pollution prevention planner” certify each plan as
having met the law’s criteria for what pollution prevention plans
should contain. Interestingly, although firms are required to go
through the planning process and develop systems for reducing the
use and emissions of toxic substances, TURA does not require
firms to reduce toxics use or emissions, nor even to comply with
their own plans. The Act just imposes the managerial requirement:
“plan.”
II. MANAGEMENT MATTERS
Management-based regulations and incentive programs are
premised on the notion that a firm’s internal management critically
shapes its impact on environmental quality. This underlying
assumption is gaining support in a growing body of academic
research. Recent ethnographic studies have shown that what goes
on inside companies can make an important difference in shaping
their environmental behavior and outcomes.22 A survey by
Richard Florida and Derek Davison revealed that the companies
adopting formal EMSs tended to be more cutting-edge firms that
adopted innovative manufacturing processes more generally.23 Of
course, the survey could not untangle the causal direction of the
relationship; it seems likely that progressive management would
lead firms to adopt EMSs more than the reverse.
21

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21I, §§ 1–23 (2002).
JENNIFER
HOWARD-GRENVILLE,
CORPORATE
CULTURE
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE: MAKING CHANGE AT A HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
MANUFACTURER (2007); ASEEM PRAKASH, GREENING THE FIRM: THE POLITICS
OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000). For a strategic account of how
environmental management can pay off for firms, see FOREST L. REINHARDT,
DOWN TO EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT (2000).
23
Richard Florida & Derek Davison, Why Do Firms Adopt Advanced
Environmental Practices (and Do They Make a Difference)?, in REGULATING
FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE
POLICY GOALS? 88 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).
22
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In a major study of environmental behavior in the pulp and
paper industry, Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan, and Dorothy
Thornton closely examined facilities operating in several countries
and concluded that management styles played a key role in their
varied environmental performance.24 Traditional external factors
such as regulatory enforcement and economic conditions affected
compliance with environmental law, but when it came to
explaining why some pulp and paper mills went further and kept
their pollution below permitted levels, the authors concluded that
management mattered most. They argued that management styles
ranged from the “true believers”—firms that voluntarily invested
in state-of-the-art equipment and proactively searched for ways to
go beyond legal requirements—to the “environmental laggards”—
those that resisted even basic legal compliance.25
Another recent study reinforced the importance of factors
internal to organizations’ management in explaining their
environmental behavior.26 Using a matched case study design of
facilities across several sectors, Jennifer Howard-Grenville,
Jennifer Nash, and I compared participants in a voluntary,
management-based environmental program with similar facilities
facing similar external pressures but that did not participate. We
found that facilities’ participation decisions corresponded with the
kinds of organizational identities and managerial incentives that
prevailed within their operations.
A growing research literature on EMSs also generally
supports the conclusion that management makes a difference.
Numerous case studies showcase firms that have improved their
environmental performance after implementing an EMS. A
broader study of S&P 500 companies suggests that EMS adoption
typically precedes a reduction in toxic emissions when normalized
24

NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DOROTHY THORNTON, SHADES
OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2003); see also Neil
Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and
Environmental Protection: Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004).
25
GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN, supra note 24, at 99–102.
26
See generally Jennifer Howard-Grenville, Jennifer Nash & Cary
Coglianese, Constructing the License to Operate: Internal Factors and Their
Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions, 30 LAW & POL’Y 73 (2008)
(providing interview-based evidence that internal factors such as managerial
incentives, organizational culture, and organization identity can influence a
firm’s decision to go beyond compliance with environmental regulations).
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for production.27 The most rigorous analysis to date of ISO 14001
adoption in the United States finds that firms that implement ISOcertified EMSs show small, but statistically significant,
improvements in measures of both environmental compliance and
releases of toxic emissions.28
III. CAN MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES WORK?
If management plays a role in improving environmental
quality, as the evidence indicates that it does, can government
effectively induce firms to improve their environmental
management (and thereby their environmental performance)
through management-based incentives or regulations? One might
naturally predict such management-based strategies should work.
But some healthy skepticism is warranted. The actions firms
voluntarily adopt are not necessarily a valid basis for inferring
what they will do when encouraged or required by government.
The firms that voluntarily adopt an EMS presumably have a
different, and stronger, type of commitment to environmental
protection than firms that do not volunteer. Moreover, since by
definition, management-based strategies encourage or require
management practices—not necessarily improvements in
environmental outcomes—it is possible that some firms will
respond to government incentives or rules by gaming the
regulators, that is, creating documents and procedures that look
good on paper but do not reflect the (dirty) reality of actual, dayto-day operations.
These are not unreasonable concerns.
Nevertheless,
management-based strategies might well lead some firms truly to
improve their environmental performance. Management-based
strategies call upon firms to invest in the production of information
about the environmental risks they create, about alternatives to
reduce or mitigate those risks, and about procedures for continued
monitoring and information collection. The information generated
through an EMS may ultimately prompt behavioral change either
by (a) providing feedback directly to decision makers within firms
about ways to reduce potential liabilities, or (b) giving information
27

Wilma Rose Q. Anton, George Deltas & Madhu Khanna, Incentives
for Environmental Self-Regulation and Implications for Environmental
Performance, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 632, 652 (2004).
28
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 6, at 150.
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to government officials and other interested parties, who in turn
bring pressure to bear upon the firms’ decision makers.
It has sometimes been argued that, even in the absence of
regulation, socially responsible behavior yields bottom line results
for businesses—what has come to be known as “win-win
theory.”29 For example, Forest Reinhardt has shown that making
investments in social goals can advance a company’s profits if
doing so enables the company to lower production costs,
differentiate its products from competitors, or manage liability
risks better.30 Yet despite these reasons for businesses to act in
socially responsible ways, a continued need for some form of
governmental intervention indicates that firms generally do not
find enough private benefits to act in ways that are privately costly
but socially optimal. As economists caution, if there was money
simply lying on the floor in terms of profits from corporate
responsibility, companies would have picked it up already.31
These considerations about win-win theory help illuminate
three complementary accounts of how management-based
strategies might actually work to improve the environment. The
first explanation might be called a theory of “sunk search costs.”
This account, like win-win theory, recognizes that firms can reap
private rewards from investing in actions that deliver positive
social outcomes. But it also recognizes that firms face opportunity
costs associated with identifying socially beneficial actions that
also yield private actions. In other words, to extend the
economist’s analogy, firms do not find money simply lying on the
floor waiting to be picked up by taking socially responsible action.
Rather, such money lies hidden underneath the floor tiles and
behind the shop equipment—if only managers can find it. Since
finding these cost savings and competitive advantages from
socially responsible behavior is costly, rational firms will only
expend the necessary search costs when the expected net benefits
exceed the search costs. Since firms have naturally not yet found
29

See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Towards a New
Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Autumn 1995, at 97 (arguing that properly designed environmental regulation
may lead to improved competitiveness).
30
See REINHARDT, supra note 22, at xii–xiii, 13–14.
31
See, e.g., Karen W. Palmer, Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney,
Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost
Paradigm, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1995, at 119 (arguing against the “false
premise of cost-free controls”).
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their unidentified cost savings, they may well view their expected
net benefits of doing so as being quite small, discounted by a
perceived low probability estimate of finding anything worthwhile.
Firms’ managers would then conclude they are better off
dedicating their time and resources elsewhere.32 For this reason,
firms might be said to be rationally ignorant of potential win-win
opportunities. However, when management-based strategies either
mandate or encourage firms to engage in planning and analysis,
firms assume search costs that they otherwise would have avoided.
Search costs at that point become sunk costs to the firm, and
profit-enhancing actions the firm identifies along the way will be
adopted as long as they prove to be net beneficial to the firm.33
A second explanatory account focuses on the
complementarity between planning and the achievement of social
goals.34 Lori Bennear has shown that for management-based
strategies to deliver social benefits, there must be a direct
connection between the management activities required or
encouraged and the desired social outcomes.
This
complementarity is most readily apparent with problems that arise
due to poor management. Accidents in chemical plants, for
example, could be expected to occur more frequently in facilities
with poor oversight and coordination. At the limit, entirely
untrained workers who mix chemicals on their own accord,
without supervision, would clearly be expected to be more likely
to cause an accident. Therefore, to the extent that there are
management-based problems that generate environmental
consequences, then management is clearly complementary and
management-based strategies will make sense. For these types of
problems, strategies to encourage or require management would
yield beneficial results if firms are not already engaging in a
socially optimal level or quality of analysis, planning, and other
complementary management activities. The lack of good planning
itself can be a type of market failure.
Finally,
mandatory
management-based
strategies
(particularly, regulations) may prove effective due to the
background threat of tort liability or other regulatory liability. If
32

See Bennear, supra note 20, at 54–55.
This does not mean, of course, that a firm’s adoption of environmentally
beneficial actions found after an investment of search costs in an EMS will
necessarily be net beneficial to society.
34
See Bennear, supra note 20, at 55.
33
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firms face a risk of liability when they discover problems but do
nothing to solve them, then once they discover problems during a
mandated management-based planning process, they have a preexisting background incentive to take action to solve them. On
this account, it is not solely the management-based regulation that
operates to induce firms to make costly investments that follow
from management-based regulation, but the interaction between
management-based regulation and other legal norms. However,
under this account, incentives that merely encourage better
environmental management will probably prove less effective,
because many firms will probably not voluntarily engage in
planning and management activities that could later expose them
to legal liability.
Ultimately, the question of whether management-based
strategies are effective—and if so, what best explains their
success—is an empirical one. Getting empirical leverage on these
matters, though, is not always easy. When it comes to voluntary
programs like Performance Track, government officials often tout
the significant reported improvements achieved by participating
facilities.35 But given the voluntary nature of these programs, we
cannot easily know whether participants’ improvements would
have occurred anyway. Perhaps facilities that improve their
performance for other reasons also seek out membership in
management-based incentive programs in order to gain recognition
and reward for progress they would be making anyway. At
present, the lack of available data on facilities before they
participated in performance track programs, as well as on facilities
not involved in these programs, inhibits the ability of researchers
and government decision makers to discern whether incentivebased environmental management programs actually work.36
The available research of other kinds of voluntary programs
might suggest that, at their best, programs like Performance Track
will yield only modest results. After reviewing the results of seven
case studies of voluntary environmental programs in the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan, Richard Morgenstern and William Pizer found
that “none of the case study authors found truly convincing
35
See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE TRACK FIFTH
ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/
perftrac/downloads/PTPRreport_05final.pdf (citing conservation numbers of
Performance Track members).
36
See Borck et al., supra note 14.
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evidence of dramatic environmental improvements.”37 Aseem
Prakash and Matthew Potoski, in the best available study of the
impact of voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 certification in the
U.S., characterized these effects as rather “modest.”38 Once
Prakash and Potoski had controlled for other factors, they found
that ISO-certified “facilities spent on average one week less time
out of compliance with government regulation.”39 In terms of
toxic emissions, their results were “difficult to interpret” but
nevertheless showed “not a very large improvement difference.”40
On the assumption their data were normally distributed, Prakash
and Potoski found that ISO-certified facilities ranked at most only
3 percentiles better than non-certified facilities in terms of toxic
releases.
When it comes to management-based regulation, as opposed
to voluntary management-based incentives, some data suggest that
regulation can result in environmental gains. Insurance claims in
the chemical industry declined by 40% in the decade after the
introduction of federal risk management planning requirements.41
In the state of Massachusetts—the first state to adopt mandatory
pollution prevention planning laws—the use of toxic chemicals
declined by about 40% in the decade following the law’s adoption
in 1989, with a decline of nearly 90% in the emissions of toxic
chemicals.42 Of course, data such as these also need to be
approached with caution.
Other factors unrelated to the
introduction of management-based regulation can potentially
explain at least some of the changes in reported outcomes, whether
for the worse or for the better. Pollution could decrease for
reasons other than management-based regulation; it could also
increase, even if management-based regulation worked
successfully, if other factors overwhelmed any achieved
improvements from improved management.
37
RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN & WILLIAM A. PIZER, REALITY CHECK: THE
NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN 184 (2007).
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PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 6, at 166.
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Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 17, at 724.
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Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction Act: Design and Implementation of a Management-Based
Environmental Regulation (Harv. Univ. Reg. Pol’y Program Rep. No. RPP-072004, 2004) (on file with journal).
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Furthermore, the introduction of management-based
regulation does not always occur in isolation of other regulatory
changes. Massachusetts’s reported declines in toxic emissions, for
example, might have been affected by changes in conventional
regulations, such as the contemporaneous performance-based
hazardous air pollutant requirements in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. After all, toxic emissions declined 46% across the
entire United States during the same period.43
Moreover,
compared with neighboring states in New England, where toxic
emissions also declined an average of 87% during the same period,
the 88% decline in toxic emissions in Massachusetts does not look
nearly as striking.44 The declines reported during the same period
in New Hampshire (93%), Connecticut (92%), and Rhode Island
(91%) were somewhat larger than experienced in Massachusetts,
even though none of these other states had adopted a managementbased pollution prevention law.45
Statistical analysis needs to take account of potential
confounding effects. Lori Bennear has tested the effects of the
pollution prevention planning laws using longitudinal data on toxic
emissions from more than 30,000 facilities throughout the United
States, both those located in the fourteen states that had adopted
pollution prevention planning laws similar to TURA as well as
facilities in other states.46 These laws only require that firms
plan—not necessarily that they implement their plans. Using a
differences-in-differences statistical strategy, Bennear compared
the trends in toxic emissions across both the “experimental” group
of states with management-based regulation and the “control”
group of states having no management-based regulation.
Emissions declined everywhere, but to determine whether changes
came about due to the introduction of management-based
regulation, Bennear analyzed how the trends in management-based
regulation states fared against other states when controlling for a
variety of other factors correlated with toxic emissions. She found
that the presence of a management-based regulation in a facility’s
state was associated with about a 30 percent decrease in toxic air
43
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See Lori S. Bennear, Are Management-Based Regulations Effective?
Evidence from State Pollution Prevention Programs, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 327 (2007).
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emissions—over and above what otherwise would have occurred
in the absence of the management-based law.47 Bennear’s study is
the strongest evidence to date that management-based laws like
TURA can help reduce pollution.
That said, it is one thing for a management-based regulation
to achieve improvements in the near term, shortly following its
introduction. It is another for regulation to sustain long term and
continual improvements over time. Can management-based
regulation continue to spur firms to make improvements in the
long term? Interestingly, the statistically significant effects in the
Bennear study (at the 5 percent level) occurred within two to four
years after the imposition of a planning mandate. The statistical
significance dropped for years five and six (10 percent level).
After six years, mandatory planning requirements showed no
statistically significant effect on toxic emissions.48 These declines
in statistical significance may be an artifact of the data, resulting
from a small sample size due to the fact that there the states with
oldest management-based regulations are also the least in number.
But it is not inconceivable that the returns from management-based
regulation diminish over time. According to interviews with
facility managers subject to Massachusetts’s Toxic Use Reduction
Act, facilities achieved most of their gains in the first few years
after TURA’s planning requirement took effect. Managers
reported that with the passage of time they found fewer
opportunities (or fewer low-cost opportunities) to make further
improvements. After the so-called low-hanging fruit gets picked,
some managers treat mandatory pollution prevention planning as
little more than a paperwork exercise.49
IV. THE ROLE FOR MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES
There is surely no single way to fix all that ails the
environmental protection system in the United States.
Management-based strategies likewise are no cure-all. But the
managerial turn in environmental policy appears to have taken
hold and will not likely disappear any time soon. Managementbased strategies find support in a compelling logic that ultimately
the private sector’s compliance with environmental law and its
47
48
49

Id. at 340.
Id. at 341–42.
See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 42.
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actual progress in protecting the environment will be a function of
choices made by companies’ managers. Furthermore, as society’s
environmental problems grow more complex, and conventional
solutions appear less tractable, management-based strategies’
adaptability and flexibility only serve to increase their
attractiveness as cost-effective alternatives to traditional forms of
regulation.
Management-based strategies might be also thought of as a
first line of defense in addressing new environmental risks.
According to self-reported responses to one recent survey, the use
of management systems correlates with reported improvements in
unregulated aspects of business—such as avoiding spills or
conserving energy—but not with reported improvements in
regulated aspects, such as air and water emissions.50 The most
promising role for management strategies, then, could be to push
environmental progress on fronts not being addressed by existing
regulation. This has long been a stated goal of EPA’s Performance
Track, with its emphasis on EMSs. However, the major question
remains whether management-based strategies can truly offer
significantly improved environmental outcomes—or whether they
will just lull the public into thinking something is being done to
address new environmental problems.
Unfortunately, measuring the effectiveness of managementbased strategies on unregulated environmental problems may
prove to be a most difficult undertaking, for the same reasons that
it is difficult to evaluate any voluntary program. Unregulated
environmental problems are usually problems for which firmspecific data are not required to be reported, so even in programs
that require volunteers to report on their unregulated aspects, there
will be a lack of comparable data before the volunteers joined the
program or comparable data on firms that do not participate.
In the absence of good evaluation research, it will be difficult
to learn whether some types of management-based strategies might
work better if designed or implemented differently. In terms of
their design, present-day management-based strategies promote a
form of management that is highly systematic and rigorous, a form

50

Richard N. L. Andrews, Andrew M. Hutson & Daniel Edwards, Jr.,
Environmental Management Under Pressure: How Do Mandates Affect
Performance?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 1, at 111.
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of internal engineering.51 But clear, analytic planning and precise
forms of bureaucratic ordering are surely not the only—and maybe
not the most important—features of good management. Dramatic
changes in environmental performance may call for more creative,
less rigid, more holistic management that fosters outside-the-box
thinking. It is entirely possible that the best management
practices—whether for environmental protection or economic
success—require a much greater degree of decentralization and
internal competition within organizations than is reflected in the
current EMS ethos. More likely still, a firm’s leadership may be
what really makes the difference—and yet it is hard to imagine
how public policy could define, let alone foster, the characteristics
of the real leadership needed for firms to make and sustain
environmental change.
Implementing management-based strategies effectively also
calls for adequate oversight. Yet the very challenges that make
management-based strategies attractive—namely, complexity in
environmental problems and heterogeneity in their sources—also
present challenges in overseeing the management government
encourages or requires. Can government even know what truly
constitutes “good” management? The most knowledgeable and
sophisticated government officials still will undoubtedly have less
information than private sector managers about how to manage
their individual operations to return a profit and reduce
environmental impacts. A critical question, then, is how regulators
can overcome their informational disadvantage to ensure that firms
subjected to management-based incentives or regulation are
planning effectively and implementing those plans. Instead of
conducting performance tests or observing whether firms have
installed proper equipment, inspectors under management-based
regulation need to assess the adequacy of a firm’s planning and the
documentation of its implementation. This can amount to a
considerable new burden on certain regulatory agencies, which
may need additional resources to meet the challenges.
51
See THEO DE BRUIJN & VICKI NORBERG-BOHM, VOLUNTARY,
COLLABORATIVE, AND INFORMATION-BASED POLICIES: LESSONS AND NEXT STEPS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
(2001) (noting that “[t]he current approaches to EMS are overly bureaucratic”
and calling for efforts “to reduce transaction costs by focusing on information
generation that is useful to the firm and streamlining reporting requirements”)
(on file with journal).
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Given the challenges associated with a heavy reliance on
management-based strategies, the most appropriate role for them
in the near term would appear to be to augment conventional forms
of environmental regulation. One way of doing so is to promote
management systems that assist firms in maintaining regulatory
compliance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that management
systems do enhance firms’ compliance, and more systematic
empirical research indicates that ISO-certified EMSs are
associated with at least modest compliance improvements.52 Yet,
so far the research does not indicate whether the compliance
improvements associated with EMSs come in the form of
procedural compliance (such as in filing timely reports) or in
substantive compliance (such as in reducing harmful emissions).
Although all compliance might well be socially desirable, if all
EMSs do is help facilities handle their paperwork burdens better,
this certainly weakens the case for management-based strategies.
Environmental groups are already not enthusiastic supporters
of management-based programs like Performance Track. Even the
business community, which presumably should favor initiatives
that leave it discretion to find less costly means of addressing
environmental problems, actually exhibits ambivalence toward
management-based strategies. Many businesses have on their own
adopted ISO-certified EMSs; several major trade associations have
implemented their own management-based solutions (such as
Responsible Care); and about five hundred facilities have now
secured membership in EPA’s Performance Track program.53 But
far more firms and industries have yet to take any interest in
developing ISO-certified EMSs or joining programs like
Performance Track. Industry has also outright resisted a number
of efforts to impose management-based regulation and related
information-based requirements. The Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction Act came into existence only after industry capitulated
in the face of a credible threat of a citizen’s initiative that would
have banned the use of toxic chemicals altogether. Subsequent
52
See PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 6. It should be noted, however, that
Prakash and Potoski’s measure included compliance with the procedural
requirements as well as with substantive environmental performance limits,
without an ability to untangle whether ISO-certification was associated with
improvements in one or the other.
53
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE TRACK, supra note 13.
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attempts to expand TURA’s requirements have met with resistance
from industry, as have efforts in Congress to adopt a national
pollution prevention planning law.54 The federal Toxic Release
Inventory, which simply requires the collection and reporting of
information, has itself generated pitched battles, as have recent
federal legislative efforts to impose security-related planning
requirements on chemical facilities.
Management-based strategies offer little escape from the
contentious politics and policy gridlock that most would agree
characterized environmental policymaking at the end of the
twentieth century. On the contrary, dramatic expansion of
management-based strategies could well exacerbate ideological
line drawing. Attempts to influence or control management
processes begin to intrude into the core of private sector decision
making. What could be more central to a free enterprise system
than the ability of private managers to decide how to run their own
operations?
Some business leaders and politicians might also worry about
the extent to which management-based strategies give government
officials worrisome discretion. If effective management cannot be
easily observed and inter-subjectively validated, the risk of
arbitrary government decision making presumably increases.
Some private sector firms may be rewarded simply because they
look like they have adopted sound management practices, while
other firms that are really making a difference in reducing
pollution could go unrewarded or even punished if they lack the
kind of practices that the government deems necessary or
desirable.
CONCLUSION
Despite the potential political perils inherent in the current
managerial turn in environmental policymaking, managementbased strategies are likely to remain attractive and plausible
options to consider in charting a course for environmental policy in
the next administration and beyond. Of course, in deciding
whether and when to rely on management-based strategies, policy
54

Coglianese & Nash, supra note 42, at 88–95; STEPHEN M. JOHNSON,
ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 355 (2001); Robert Style, Are
State Laws Motivating Business to Pursue Pollution Prevention?, POLLUTION
PREVENTION, Winter 1993/94, at 61.
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makers should undertake the same kind of regulatory analysis that
they should use in evaluating any other option. Businesses may
well resist the costs or intrusiveness of the planning associated
with management-based regulations, but these planning and
paperwork requirements are justified anyway if the private sector
undersupplies effective risk management practices from the
standpoint of overall social welfare. When management-based
strategies can be shown to work better than their alternatives, they
should certainly be used.
Additional empirical evaluation is needed to understand better
precisely when and how to use management-based strategies.
There remains a need for further empirical research on the impacts
of management-based strategies, especially to learn whether they
can achieve meaningful benefits for society over the long term.
Even though existing research shows that management-based
regulation can prove successful under certain circumstances, the
question remains whether such positive effects can be sustained
over time—or whether any positive effects of management-based
regulation diminish after the low-hanging fruit has been picked.
Given what we know now, it would be folly to think that, by
themselves, management-based strategies could lead the way to a
fundamentally transformed system of environmental protection.55
Yet even if they cannot catalyze a revolution in environmental
protection, management-based strategies have shown themselves
to be a promising instrument in the policy toolkit.
The challenge for Congress and the regulatory agencies in the
future will remain one of searching for the best tools for specific
environmental problems and challenges. In some cases, the best
available alternative will take the form of the conventional
environmental regulation that has been used for the last forty
years. In other cases, it will be best to use market-based
instruments that have now been tried for specific environmental
problems like phasing out lead from gasoline or addressing sulfur
dioxide air pollution. However, in still other cases management55
On occasion, some EPA officials appear to claim that they could. See,
e.g., Daniel Fiorino, supra note 11, at 9 (“A sea change in environmental
management is underway that may well be the wave of the future.”); U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE TRACK FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT, supra
note 35, at 31 (“Performance Track and its state counterparts aim to transform
the way that government and industry address environmental issues and solve
problems.”).
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based strategies will be appropriate and useful.
Some
environmental problems, for example, stem from the operations of
a highly diverse set of industrial actors, where there is no clear
one-size-fits-all technological solution and where it is difficult for
regulators to monitor performance as necessary to enforce
emissions limits, taxes, or trading.56 In cases like these, and
perhaps others as well, legislators and regulators will likely find
the best option is to continue to make the managerial turn.

56

See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 17.

